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Abstract 
 
The “family rule” paper by Dr Foreman proposes a way of resolving the 
present uncertainty about medical law on children’s consent and refusal. This 
commentary reviews how doctors’ decisions are already well protected by 
English law and respected by the courts. The “family rule” appears to be likely 
only to complicate the already diffuse law on parental consent, and to weaken 
further the competent minor’s position in cases of uncertainty and 
disagreement. It leaves the difficult questions about defining and assessing 
children’s competence unanswered. This commentary suggests that these 
questions would be better resolved through professionally determined 
standards of good practice that respect children and parents, rather than 
through rules or laws.  
 
 
Commentary on the “Family Rule” 
 
The “family rule” paper discusses important questions for children, parents, 
doctors and other health carers. Confusion about the law leads to defensive 
medicine. It is frequently remarked that children “cannot refuse treatment”. Of 
course they can refuse, no law can stop them. The question is whether 
doctors should override their refusal, legally or morally. The English two high 
court cases, re R in 1991 and re W in 1992, which cast doubt on the 1985 
Gillick ruling, involved cases of questionable mental health, and therefore of 
questionable relevance to most minors. They were controversial rulings and 
were strongly criticised by some lawyers.   
  To put refusal in perspective, most children and parents accept medical 
recommendations. Refusal affects only a relatively few cases, and is mainly 
of three kinds. Firstly, when children are too young, or too ill, or for other 
reasons are not thought to be competent and adults have to decide for them. 
Secondly, when fear or confusion prevents a potentially competent child from 
making an informed decision. Further discussion and time to reflect can often 
help here. Thirdly, when a child is assessed by the treating doctor as 
adequately informed and competent, and refuses proposed treatment.  
  In the third instance, the type of decision is important. If the treatment is not 
urgent, it could be delayed until the child is ready to consent. Some will 
recover, in time, without treatment. With much treatment, the aim is to 
alleviate a problem in order to improve the quality of life, and surely the 
person who is usually best able to decide how necessary the treatment is will 
be the person living that life, as many doctors accept. Occasionally, informed 
children refuse urgent treatment intended to prevent irreparable deterioration, 
or to sustain or prolong life. Here, “informed” can mean profoundly 
experienced, when a child with severe chronic illness has had repeated 
treatments such as chemotherapy. As the Royal College of Paediatrics and 
Child Health Report (1) discusses, doctors are now more willing to share 
these extremely difficult decisions with patients and families and to respect 
the child’s views.   
  Another important factor is whether the concerned adults’ decisions are 
unanimous, uncertain or controversial. If all the adults unanimously and 
adamantly disagree with the child, it is hard to see why they cannot reason 
with and convince a competent child. If they cannot do so, it is likely that 
either the decision or the child is unreasonable. If the child is judged to be 
unreasonable, and therefore not competent, the parents have to make the 
decision. In complex cases of disagreement there may be strong arguments 
on each side, and then it is likely that some of the adults may have doubts 
and at least partly sympathise with the child’s refusal. When the prognosis is 
uncertain and involves high risk and uncertain benefit, or when the adults 
disagree, some will support what they see as the child’s competent decision.  
  The law already gives authority to the treating doctor to proceed on the 
consent of only one of the relevant people - the minor or any one of the adults 
with parental responsibility.(2) In English law, the child is currently very well 
protected (or restricted).  The law is also most likely to support doctors who 
accept a child’s refusal against the parents’ wishes. All the relevant reported 
court cases have supported medical opinion either to withhold or to proceed 
with a child’s treatment against the parents’ wishes. In the one exception, re 
R 1997, the young boy whose parents wished to refuse a liver transplant, the 
child’s parents were intensive care nurses, so that the court could be seen 
here as supporting a professional, not a lay, opinion. The courts also respect 
doctors’ decisions in that judges do not force doctors to treat, and only 
authorise them to do so.  
  The case of 11-year-old disabled David Glass (July 1999), whose family 
failed to get the Court to insist that doctors provide life-saving treatment if 
David should need it, shows the limitations of any “family rule”. The case of M 
(July 1999), the 15-year-old who refused to accept an emergency heart 
transplant, shows how Judges appear to be willing to allow doctors to enforce 
almost any form of treatment, however extreme, on to resisting minors. 
Because court cases are based on precedents, the Judge might seem to 
have no other option than once again to follow expert medical opinion and 
endorse the doctors’ decisions. This routine judicial response seems to 
reduce listening to the resisting child or parents into an empty formality, which 
disguises the lack of justice in the sense of impartial balancing of two sides. 
Justice is compromised by the prior assumption of a great imbalance between 
“expert” medical views and inexpert “lay” ones.  
  Although media reports compared M’s case with enforced feeding of girls 
with anorexia, the few publicised comments by M showed that she 
understood that having a new heart was something entirely different and 
extraordinary. Some paediatric cardiac staff emphasise the time and careful 
support required while children and parents gradually come to accept that a 
dreaded heart transplant is preferable to dying of the untreated heart 
condition.(3) With the shortage of donor organs, clinical staff stress the 
importance of selecting from among potential recipients those who are most 
likely to benefit and to willingly cooperate with life-long follow-up treatment. 
Given a little more time, M may have arrived voluntarily at this crucial 
acceptance, and she was reported to have done so. The Court ruling appears 
to underestimate the importance of time and mutual trust in these delicate 
professional-patient relationships. The ruling appears to support doctors who 
wish to over-rule even older teenagers, and to make doctors who do respect 
these patients more vulnerable to criticism and litigation. 
  It is therefore unclear what the “family rule” adds to current legal control of 
minors except, it seems, to complicate matters: to increase adult power over 
the child; to reduce concern to listen and respectfully negotiate with the child 
in ways which many doctors regard as part of therapy; potentially to 
aggravate discord among families who disagree: and to enforce treatment on 
resisting “children”, it seems up to the age of 18 years.  
  Dr Foreman’s mention of a “modal” age of consent misreports the research 
referred to.(3) In this descriptive study, the main finding was that children’s 
competence to consent to a particular decision depends on their own related 
experience, the type of decision, and the information, support and respect 
given or withheld by adults, far more than on the child’s age or tested 
intelligence. As the study showed, adults’ and children’s assessments of 
competence very widely, and are coloured by their high or low expectations of 
children’s abilities. Different samples of young patients are likely to vary too 
much to provide a generalisable modal age.    
  The “family” is not defined in the family rule. Does it include step and natural 
parents, for example? The essence of consent is an explicit, informed, 
unpressured agreement between reasonably equal partners. This cannot 
apply to any notion of a baby “consenting” to join a family, which is given as 
one rationale for the family rule. The concept of the family rule assumes 
harmonious concern for the sick child’s best interests. When this exists, as is 
most families, an explicit rule is unnecessary. When there is discord, this 
essential harmony that validates the family rule is missing. In these difficult 
cases, the family rule does not address the key questions: What are the 
child’s best interests? How much information has to be shared with the child 
to be sufficient? When is a child competent? Are psychiatrists the best 
qualified judges in these matters? What is good practice with children who 
consent or refuse, who are judged as competent or incompetent, and how 
can it be promoted? How can health care professionals be supported in 
observing high standards, and be protected from litigation? A British Medical 
Association working group is considering these questions which, as Jonathan 
Montgomery and I have discussed,(4) are too subtle for legal solutions which 
are designed to prevent bad practice but not to promote good practice. 
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